Shifting Bilateralism: Understanding Change in the US-Japan Alliance During the Cold and Gulf War by Anderla, Grant
College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University 
DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU 
All College Thesis Program, 2016-present Honors Program 
Spring 5-4-2018 
Shifting Bilateralism: Understanding Change in the US-Japan 
Alliance During the Cold and Gulf War 
Grant Anderla 
gtanderla@csbsju.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/honors_thesis 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anderla, Grant, "Shifting Bilateralism: Understanding Change in the US-Japan Alliance During the Cold and 
Gulf War" (2018). All College Thesis Program, 2016-present. 50. 
https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/honors_thesis/50 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in All College Thesis Program, 2016-present by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Shifting Bilateralism: Understanding Change in the US-Japan 
Alliance During the Cold and Gulf War 
 
An All College Thesis 
 
College of Saint Benedict/Saint John’s University 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for Distinction in the Department of Political Science 
 
By 
 
Grant Anderla 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Shifting Bilateralism 
 1 
Project title: Shifting Bilateralism: Understanding Change in the US-Japan Alliance During the 
Cold and Gulf War 
 
By Grant Anderla 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Dr. Christi Siver 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Dr. John Friend 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Dr. Philip Kronebusch 
Professor of Political Science 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Dr. Claire Haeg 
Chair, Department of Political Science 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Molly Ewing  
Director, All College Thesis Program 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Jim Parsons  
Director, All College Thesis Program 
 
 
 
  Shifting Bilateralism 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank those who have helped me in this process of writing my All College Thesis. 
I am so grateful for my family and friends who have supported me each day as I researched and 
wrote. I especially want to thank Christi Siver, John Friend, and Phil Kronebusch for reading this 
paper and ensuring that the final version was better than the first. I finally want to thank 
everyone in the Political Science Department, including my classmates, for pushing me to work 
harder and become a better student. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Shifting Bilateralism 
 3 
Abstract 
 Emerging from a violent past as unlikely partners, the alliance of the United States and 
Japan has withstood years of cooperation and competition. Today, the two nations face regional 
threats from North Korea and China. Considering the unique alliance, I hope to provide a 
framework for understanding inter-alliance management and policy making processes. 
Subsequently, I consider one main question in my research. What factors explain continuities 
and changes within this alliance relationship? To address this question, I consider leadership role 
conception, role prescription, and norms of consultation that contribute to changes within 
alliance relations. 
Analyzing these variables in the case of the US-Japan alliance provides a clearer 
understanding of what contributes to policy change in bilateral alliances. Research on alliances 
often fails to address normative variables and attributes much of change to arguments posed in 
the realist camp that emphasize system pressures. Focusing on different aspects of decision-
making expands the research on change in alliances and fills the gap of intra-alliance relations 
research. I analyze the alliance at two different time periods in the relationship. First, alliance 
relations and security policy during the Nixon and Sato leadership give a better understanding of 
the Okinawa Reversion and Nuclear Deterrent issue of 1972. Second, the 1991 Persian Gulf 
Crisis raised tensions due to unclear roles and a lack of norms of consultation. The roles that 
these nations play in the alliance illustrate how tensions are alleviated or heightened due to role 
variation and the strength of consultation norms.  Role conceptions and perceptions along with 
formal or informal norms of consultation contribute to changes in alliance relations. The 
presence of norms of consultation and alignment of roles alleviates tension.    
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Introduction 
North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons program and North Korea’s missile 
tests in and near the Sea of Japan present unique security challenges for any alliances engaging 
in the region.1 The geopolitical situation in the region therefore makes any research on the US-
Japan alliance valuable. The United States and Japan interact; conscious of these regional threats, 
seeking to develop policy that protects against these threats. What factors explain continuities 
and changes within this alliance relationship? During the Cold War, the United States sought 
alliances to prevent the spread of communism and fascism. The United States formed beneficial 
alliances in Northeast Asia via the San Francisco Treaty System.2 The alliance between the 
United States and Japan has experienced a number of changes during its history. For the US-
Japan alliance, tensions caused by change did not break up the alliance. Analysis of decision-
making and interaction helps to present alternative explanations for change in alliance 
relationships that can inform policymakers. This research benefits international relations 
literature by seeking to understand leadership interactions in alliances alongside potential factors 
that influence policy change in foreign relations.  
 First, I provide a literature review of alliance literature and include the literature of two 
variables that influence our understanding of change in alliance policy. While realist theories 
have strengths for understanding alliances, there are limitations that should be addressed.   
This review considers two explanations for change in alliance relations. First, roles are important 
for understanding nation behavior. Roles provide nations with norms and behaviors for acting in 
                                                 
1 Claire Phipps, “North Korea: ballistic missile launched over Japan – as it happened” The 
Guardian, (September 15, 2017). 
2 Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016.)  
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the international system. According to Holsti, role conceptions are “the perceptions, values, and 
attitudes of the actor occupying a position” that are the “crucial independent variables in 
explaining role performance.”3 This means that an actors behavior is tied to its role conception. 
On the other hand, role perceptions are “the norms and expectations cultures, societies, 
institutions, or groups attach to particular positions.”4 Role perceptions tie a certain expectation 
or norm to a nation and inform the role conception. Second, norms of consultation are the 
socially constructed methods for improving cooperation and co-determination.  Thomas Risse 
argues that, “norms of regular consultation, of joint-consensus building, and nonhierarchy should 
legitimize and enable allied influence.”5 In other words, allies can influence each other through 
cooperation and discussion regarding shared interests and policy.  
Historical analysis and following decision-making processes help understand US alliance 
policy changes over time and improve shared understanding of roles and norms between allies. 
Historical analysis researchers analyze the processes and interactions between states to explain 
larger trends in the international system. Methodologically, I use process tracing, historical 
analysis, and broadly follow some of the methods used by Holsti and Risse-Kappen in their 
research on foreign policy decision-making. This methodology helps me to draw parallels with 
other policy changes to determine if alliance change is influenced by roles and norms. Primary 
documents and policy information give some idea about the processes of decision-making and 
possibly show where tensions arise from. Data primarily comes from the Digital National 
                                                 
3 Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International 
Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 239. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Cooperation among Democracies” (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 34.  
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Security Archives. Other sources include newspapers, speeches, and memorandum that I draw 
from relevant databases.  
 I then give a background of the history of the US-Japan alliance for context regarding the 
alliance. Following this background, I give data referencing the time when President Richard 
Nixon was in office. First, I use data from 1969 to 1972 to discuss the issue of Okinawa’s 
reversion from the United States to Japan. This data is primarily in the form of memoranda and 
reports on the issue from within the Executive Branch and State Department of the United States 
Government. In the second section, I observe the US-Japan alliance during the Gulf War Crisis. 
Using information about both President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu along with content from 
government officials, such as speeches and memoranda, I consider how tensions rose in the 
alliance at this time period.  From my analysis, I conclude that nations that understand each 
other’s roles and establish norms of consultation improve foreign policy making because of 
better information and mutual understanding.  
 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
In this section, I provide a basic review of alliance literature that emphasizes bilateral 
alliances. I consider two schools of thought on alliance relations, namely, realist and 
constructivist approaches. Much of the current literature on alliances focuses on formation and 
explanatory components of alignment. Authors do not often write about the longevity of 
alliances and political shifts in alliance relations. A variety of factors can explain cooperation 
among states. I consider realism first to acknowledge the importance of the theory, however, I do 
not use this approach for explaining my thesis. With regard to constructivism, I discuss a role-
based approach and a normative approach focused on consultation.  
  Shifting Bilateralism 
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Realist Theory 
Realist theory argues that alliances exist to build up material power and prevent conflict 
by securing more power than other states.6 In realist theory, there are two primary forms of the 
alliance. A balancing alliance occurs when a state forms an alliance to gain a benefit from the 
other states’ resources. Alternatively, states form a balancing alliance to oppose threatening 
power from rising states. The alternative to a balancing alliance is a bandwagoning alliance. 
Bandwagoning alliances occur when an alliance-seeking state joins the stronger side of a conflict 
to try to ensure its own safety.7 Importantly, these two types of alliances exist to gain an 
advantage against an enemy or prevent enemies from gaining power. In realism then, one type of 
alliance is a weaker state aligning with a stronger state to gain protection while the larger state 
aims to protect resources and maintain international control.8 Realist theory argues that states’ 
primary motive is maintaining material power strength over other states and alliances are one 
way for states to build material power.    
Realists view power as material, emphasizing the importance of military size, amount of 
weapons, and economic strength. Moreover, alliances involve “military collaboration” which 
entails “military cooperation against particular other states.”9 This cooperation involves physical 
presence of material strength. Bilateral alliances continue since there is little need to leave the 
                                                 
6 For an in-depth analysis of realist theory, consider, Stephen Walt’s Origin of Alliances (1990), 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Relations (1979), George Liska’s Nations in Alliance: 
The Limits of Interdependence (1968), and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948). 
7 Charles Glaser, “Realism,” in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 18. Charles Glaser provides these descriptions of balancing and 
bandwagoning and uses the Waltzian theory of realism to provide these definitions.  
8 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Washington, DC. Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1968). Also read, Stephen M. Walt. 1990. The Origins of Alliances, (Cornell 
University) for more on realism. 
9 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability" International Organization 45, no. 1 
(1991): 123. 
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alliance for a weaker power, and stronger states benefit from having additional allies to balance 
against opposing large powers.10  Again, this literature emphasizes the importance of balancing 
in terms of material power and places much less emphasis on factors like diplomacy, norms, and 
a possibility of peace through community.  Glenn Snyder considers the alliance to be an “explicit 
mutual declaration of future intent” that holds states to engage physically in potential conflict.11 
At the system level, he considers alignment as the “expectations held by policymakers” 
wondering who will support the other in situations of conflict.12 Alignment is directly related to 
conflict and threat of power shifts. 
The realist literature exists in two major forms related to the international system. 
Structural realism considers power relations in a bipolar system, like in the case of the bipolar 
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Structural realists 
argue that smaller states will align with a larger state for security. Traditional realism, on the 
other hand, emphasizes factors of threat perception, bargaining, and competition among state 
interests.13 The variables considered by traditional realism encompass a larger number of 
possible explanations for alliance formation but still place much of the focus on material power. 
Certainly, these variables explain aspects of alliance relations.  
However, realism fails to explain diplomatic influence over allies or non-use of material 
power in conflict. For example, European influence on US foreign policy during the Korean War 
cannot be entirely explained by power balancing or shifting threat perceptions.14  Thomas Risse-
                                                 
10 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance theory: A neorealist first cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, 
no. 1 (1990): 103-123. 
11 Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 123. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US 
Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, 1995), 12. 
14 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 75. 
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Kappen argues that US allies in Europe and Canada influenced the United States decisions 
surrounding the armistice agreement during the Korean War.  The allied negotiations played a 
role in shifting the US away from conflict and choose ceasefire instead. Realism also struggles to 
explain the absence of conflict, for example, in the case of nuclear non-use. Nina Tannewald 
argues that a “nuclear taboo” exists that prevents the use of nuclear weapons. She argues that 
there is a global norm of nuclear non-use that comes from antinuclear nonstate actors and public 
opinion.15 Realism fails in part because it tends to infer state interests from the power structure of 
the international system rather than considering interests independently from the real power 
relationships.16 Liberal and constructivist theories can help to understand state interests with 
variables like diplomatic communication or role development which influence national interests 
without material power change.  
Role Theory  
When considering bilateral alliances, there are endogenous factors that are at play within 
alliance relations. Individual actors within a state often determine the direction of foreign policy. 
Role theory emphasizes the importance of elite policymakers in determining foreign policy and 
public opinion is considered ineffective in shifting foreign policy generally.17 Broadly, roles are 
norms of behavior that involved parties adjust policy toward and subsequent state actions may 
suggest conformity or rejection of those norms. Kalevi Holsti considers that role conception is 
                                                 
15 Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International 
Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 5-49.  
16 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 20. 
17 Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on 
Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 
(2012): 5-24. 
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the set of “appropriate behaviors” related to perceived “functions and positions.”18  Essentially, a 
leader determines their appropriate actions based on its conceptualized function within their 
position. This position can be within the state or in the international system at large and provides 
the leader with a framework for determining his or her functions. A nation’s role is crafted by a 
leader and stems from an understanding of function and position in international relations.  
 The leader’s conception of their nation’s role is potentially significant for determining the 
direction of policy in the alliances.19 Analysis of state behavior can benefit from research on role 
conceptions for two reasons. First, “identities and role conceptions are social phenomena, they 
can be shared, even among most of the individuals in a state.”20 Second, foreign policy makers 
act “based on the ideas about the roles of their states in the world and which roles will be 
acceptable to their constituents.”21 For these reasons, foreign policy is partially directed by role 
conceptions held by foreign policy makers.  Leaders construct normative expectations for 
themselves and for their allies, resulting in expectations for each nation.  
 Holsti’s study on role conception provides examples of social and normative factors that 
influence a leader to conceive a national role. In foreign policy decision-making, the role 
expectations are difficult to determine because of the variation in influence from domestic or 
external changes. For both role conception and role prescription factors like culture, citizenship, 
                                                 
18 Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International 
Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 239. 
19 For more research that uses role theory, consider, Kalevi Holsti, “National Role Conceptions 
in the Study of Foreign Policy,” (1970), Stephen Walker, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis” (1987), James Rosenau, “Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity” (1990), and Chavetz, et al, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and 
Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” (1996). 
20 Glenn Chavetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy: 
Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” Political  
Psychology 17, (1996): 733. 
21 Ibid.  
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social mores, traditions, and leaders’ self-conceptions determine the role of the nation. 
Endogenous and external factors like political opinion, ally interests, and international conflict 
contribute to the formation of role conceptions. According to Holsti, the decisions that result 
from a role conception can generally be understood by observing leadership.22 Leaders develop a 
role conception, but public opinion, national values, ideology, traditional roles, and political 
needs also directly affect national role conceptions. Further pressure comes from treaty 
commitments, informal understandings, and external system structures but Holsti argues that 
these variables may not be as influential.23 
 Holsti observes a number of factors that influence the leader in determining their role 
and actions. His study focuses on where these role conceptions come from. To determine origin 
of roles, he analyzes nine hundred seventy-two leadership statements and agreements between 
nations to determine what types of role conceptions exist. He categorizes seventeen role 
conceptions perceived by states. Examples of these role conceptions include regional protector, 
regional leader, faithful ally, and regional-subsystem collaborator. These concepts are useful 
and provide a framework for my understanding of the US-Japan alliance although I use different 
terms. The use of these role conceptions moves the research away from analysis of independent 
decisions and poses opportunities for the study of more general decision-making. Considering 
individual decisions in relation to the national role conception assists in understanding decision-
making because role conceptions determine behavior.  
To test how roles impact foreign policy and alliance relations, I use the approach taken by 
Holsti, Chavetz, et al, and Dal and Ersęn. I focus on the speeches, conversations, and writings of 
                                                 
22 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 243. 
23 Ibid. 
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leaders and other members of foreign policy and government institutions to understand role 
conceptions and expectations. I then connect these role conceptions and expectations to role 
performance to asses how roles determine foreign policy.  
Norms of Consultation 
Normative factors play an important role in determining the ability of allies to influence 
one another. Allies sometimes determine policies and roles through deliberation and 
consultation. Decision-making is a direct result of intra-alliance dialogue between governments. 
Regular consultation may arise as a norm within an alliance.24 Analyzing dialogue and norms as 
a normative approach helps understand the value of communication in inter-alliance 
policymaking. According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, constructivists studying 
change understand that, “idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system 
transformation” in an ideational international structure.25 To understand how political change can 
occur in alliance structures, understanding norms is important. Changes in policy from 
consultations are seen in a number of cases. The US and Great Britain established a norm of 
consultation during the Korean War that prevented General MacArthur from attacking China 
without prior consultation with the British.26 Western Europe used influence to push the US 
towards armistice negotiations in the Korean War.27 
                                                 
24 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 34. 
25 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change." International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 894. 
26 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 46. 
27 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community,” in 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 378. 
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Through norms of consultation, smaller states can influence larger states in an alliance.28 
Allied nations like Great Britain can influence US decisions on policies regarding the nuclear 
ban and preventing conflict pursuit, such as in the case of the Korean War. Among other 
explanations, “norms of regular consultation, of joint-consensus building, and nonhierarchy 
should legitimize and enable allied influence.”29 From both allies, increased communication and 
deliberation allows for growth of influence from both allies, but particularly for the smaller ally. 
Consultation leads to “co-determination” between states and allows for more political symmetry 
and shared goals. However, a lack of consultation or a disconnect between two allies in this 
regard can strain the relationship and reduce cooperation.  
 Some argue that “talk is cheap,” but a number of constructivists challenge this view, 
seeking to consider communication and consultation affect foreign policy making. For example, 
during the Cold War the deliberation during the “two plus four” talks between East and West 
Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union played an important 
role in concluding the Cold War.30 The two plus four talks helped establish the reunification of 
Germany by 1990 through meetings and other forms of consultation between the group of six 
actors. The deliberations that led to reunification show the possibility for nations to debate and 
change their goals.31 Communication of norms and desired interests resulted in a largely 
beneficial end.   
                                                 
28 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 37. 
29 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 34. 
30 Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics” International 
Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-39. 
31 Ibid. 
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Research regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons often includes normative 
communication as an explanatory variable.32 Rather than real power balancing alone, socially 
constructed factors like shared values and communication of norms play a role in preventing the 
use of dangerous weapons.33 Political relationships like those between Great Britain and the 
United States or Japan and the United States play an important role in exploring the effects of 
communication in explaining the changing state of alliances. Communication increases saliency 
and helps to “develop mutual trust, confidence, and similar perceptions of international 
problems.”34 However, as with many constructivist arguments, there remain challenges for 
measurement and operationalization in explaining how much these normative variables really 
contribute to influencing foreign policies of allied nations. For the norm of consultation in 
particular, two challenges persist. First, the increased use of consultation in alliances may 
decrease the norms explanatory power because allies may be less likely to create new norms 
once others are established.35 Second, Risse-Kappen recognizes that, “political actors tend to lie 
about and obscure their ‘real’ motives.”36 These issues do not necessarily negate the validity of 
the study but impact my ability to determine the significance of consultation in certain instances.  
 The research regarding alliance relations could benefit from more explanations that use 
normative variables and methods to explain aspects of foreign policy decision-making. There is a 
focus on material power interests in the literature and research on the internal dialogues between 
                                                 
32 Nina Tannewald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear 
Non-Use.” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433-468. 
33 Tannewald, “The Nuclear Taboo.”  
34 Kalevi J. Holsti, “Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and 
Fragmentation,” in Change in the International System eds. Ole R. Holsti, et al, (Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1980), 30. 
35 Thomas Risse-Kappen. Cooperation Among Democracies, 40.  
36 Ibid.  
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allies should be included to the literature. I aim to fill this gap of alliance literature by using 
alternative explanatory variables that focus on identity and socially constructed relations. I use 
role theory as a basis for doing deeper analysis on the effects of identity on alliance relations. I 
explore norms alongside identity research, norms of consultation being one example of possible 
norms.  
 
Research Design 
 
In this section, I present my variables and methods used for this research. First, I provide 
the variables and measurements. Next, I present my hypotheses and consider the implications of 
these hypotheses. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the data sources used in my research. 
My dependent variable is a change in alliance policy or relations. Change includes an 
improvement or deterioration of relations or a specific policy change. To measure changes in 
relations, I make assessments of the statements made by policy-makers to determine a view of 
the relationship. Policy change is measured by the emergence of a new policy.  
My first independent variable is role fulfillment. Role fulfillment occurs when a nation 
acts as its role conceptions and expectations suggest. This variable is measured by analyzing 
statements and communications between leaders in the alliance and comparing the actions of the 
nation against the conceptions and expectation.37  
The second independent variable is the norm of consultation. Norms of consultation can 
be formal or informal, meaning a treaty or agreement clearly includes them or they exist because 
of shared desire to communicate frequently. I measure this variable by searching speeches, 
statements, or other communications for language that suggests an interest in consultation or 
                                                 
37 This method is used by Kalevi Holsti in “National Role Conceptions in Foreign Policy” and by 
Glenn Chavetz, et al in “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” 
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continued discussion.38 I primarily focus on speeches from leaders but include relevant 
statements and speeches members of government closely involved with policymaking. 
I test two hypotheses in this research. The first emphasizes the relationship between 
nation’s roles and political symmetry between allies. The second considers the effect of norms of 
consultation on political symmetry.  
H1: Allied nations that fulfill their role conceptions and follow expected behavior will 
experience positive change in alliance relations and policy formulation. 
 H2: Allied nations that employ norms of consultation will have a stronger understanding 
of expected behavior and benefit from a more stable, low-tension relationship. 
 If nations fulfill roles and norms of regular consultation exist, it is likely that changes in 
policy or relational status of the allies will be positive and bilateral decision-making will 
improve. Role performance can impact an alliance because a country’s role gives allies the 
ability to predict actions. If nations understand ally roles, the nation can predict desired outcomes 
and can determine policy actions better. Norms of consultation seem closely connected to role 
theory and allow allies to determine roles and increase understanding of mutually desired 
policies.  
The data I used for this study are primary source materials on policies and leadership 
statements concerning the role of the allies or that provide some evidence that there is a 
consultative relationship that is well established. These primary sources are in the form of 
speeches or memoranda directly referencing the policy relations between allied nations. Other 
types of data include congressional research reports or Congress member statements. 
Furthermore, policy memoranda provide a broader view of alliance relations from within the 
                                                 
38 Thomas Risse-Kappen uses this method in his book Cooperation Among Democracies. 
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United States. This information I used comes from the Digital National Security Archive, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, and newspaper archives.  
It is important to recognize a number of challenges and biases within this research. With 
the two different time periods, the relationship’s consultation is further institutionalized as time 
progresses. It is difficult to measure the effects of consultation within the alliance over time but 
the communications between the governments remain relevant. Unfortunately, formal 
consultation norms do not exist for every situation which limits my ability to determine the 
effectiveness of formalized norms in policy decision-making. As consultation becomes regular, 
allies may not explicitly state that consultation is needed even when consultation occurs 
regularly. Over time then, regular norms of consultation may become less clear, but large 
amounts of diplomatic and communication data help uncover consultation’s impact. It is also 
important to note that government officials and leaders are not always honest about their 
interests. Although information can be misleading, words play an important role in 
understanding the goals and interests of a nation.  
The two selected time periods have different types of information available and the 
databases do not provide information that is entirely equal in depth or value. While the case 
study of the Okinawa Reversion uses direct statements from leaders in the form of declassified 
documents regarding national security policy, the section on the Gulf War uses less information 
from classified sources and includes fewer direct statements from the president or close advisors. 
However, this section includes a larger variation in the source type and includes Congressional 
statements and congressional research.   
Finally, a note on my case. The US-Japan alliance is unique because of its long history of 
bilateralism and shared decision-making. The United States directly influenced the construction 
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of Japan’s constitution and government. Japan relies heavily on US security, which further 
implies a unique relationship. Analyzing this alliance gives opportunities to see how decision-
making processes happen in strong alliances. My two observations within the case, the Okinawa 
reversion policy and the Persian Gulf War challenge both present unique opportunities for 
analysis. Both are closely tied to security, but the context is significantly different for each. I 
chose these separate time periods because I could consider the impact of changing leadership and 
shifting international dynamics. The first issue was during the Cold War while the second was 
immediately after, and global dynamics shifted. Looking at different time periods allows me to 
see whether role dynamics and consultation are truly influential to alliance relations.  
 
Historical Background – US-Japan Alliance Relations since 1945 
 In 1945, at the end of a brutal conflict, the United States forced the Japanese to surrender 
and established a military occupation of the defeated nation. The primary goal of this occupation 
was to prevent Japan from remilitarization and fascist rule.39 The United States had to make a 
choice to deal with Japan. Ultimately, the US government determined that the best option was to 
form a close bilateral security alliance to prevent Japan from aligning with communists in Asia. 
This alliance structure enabled the United States to closely monitor Japan and push Japan to 
support US interests.40 National Security Advisor George Kennan described Japan as the “key to 
Asia” that would allow the United States to engage in the region.41 
Three major developments occurred during the occupation of Japan. First, the US 
introduced a new constitution in 1947 and established a new government. Article 9 of the 
                                                 
39 Cha, Powerplay, 122.  
40 Cha, Powerplay, 123. 
41 Ibid.  
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constitution was the most significant shift for Japan, which required Japan to “forever renounce 
war as a sovereign right” along with a promise not to maintain a “war potential.”42 Second, the 
Americans pushed to reform much of the civic environment. The government became a 
parliamentary democracy, church and state were separated, and Japan’s education system 
reformed to push new liberal democratic values.43 The United States pushed for major economic 
reform at this time as well. Early in the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur pushed to 
improve economic growth unsuccessfully. Production was low, unemployment was high, and the 
possibility of famine was on the horizon. MacArthur and the occupation government, under the 
direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), implemented some 
economic reforms but these were ultimately unsuccessful due to concerns about reparations and 
low investment and lending. There was a push from some in the United States to implement a 
change in occupation policies. 
In 1948, George Kennan presented a report to Secretary of State George Marshall on the 
status of the occupation in Japan.44 In his view, the policies of the early occupation were not 
beneficial to Japan or the United States. He suggested that a more hands-off approach should be 
pursued and “economic recovery should be made the prime objective of the United States policy 
in Japan for the coming period.”45 This approach led to a “reversal of US policy in Japan” which 
lowered the number of occupation forces, punitive policies, and removed the overly dominant 
role that the United States played. Policies sought to protect Japan from external threats and 
ensure stable economic growth to eliminate a possible shift towards communism. For example, 
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tax reform and inflation control policies revitalized the Japanese economy by 1950. The United 
States provided a large amount of humanitarian aid to Japan in the form of food and materials to 
improve industry growth. One other major initiative in addition to economic reform was a 
decrease of US military presence in Japan. Kennan viewed this decrease as necessary to reduce 
the number of US tactical forces to reduce spending and the “psychological impact of their 
presence on the Japanese population.”46 
In 1951, John Foster Dulles went to Tokyo to discuss the possibility of a peace treaty 
with Japan. The proposed treaty was beneficial for Japan and led to an end of purging of 
Japanese elites (an occupation strategy to eliminate far-right sympathizers) and Japan received 
full sovereignty of the islands, with the exception of Okinawa.47 The peace treaty also required 
the United States to consider their regional power position and alliance formation. Victor Cha 
argues that the United States formed a bilateral alliance with Japan because it “legitimized and 
enshrined America’s near-absolute control over Japan’s internal and external affairs.”48  
Ultimately, this strategy, called “powerplay” by Cha, positioned the United States as the 
defender of Japan and East Asia from communism and allowed vast control over Japan’s 
position in the international system. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida created a strategy that 
focused on economic reform while the United States guaranteed the security of Japan. Japan’s 
strategy was a direct result of this US decision and shifted Japan to become a nation that would 
avoid rearmament and maintain a small defense force. This relationship is the basis for the 
military shield that the United States provided for Japan following the occupation.   
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One major point of contention seemed to remain at this time. The United States 
maintained complete control over Okinawa to fulfill its defensive role in the region. The United 
States did not consider Okinawa to be a part of Japan during the occupation and control over the 
island did not pose any obvious problems in the eyes of the United States. However, by the 
1960s, the Japanese government considered Okinawa to be a part of Japan. It was during this 
time that there was a call to revert Okinawa to Japan for the sake of Japan’s sovereignty and the 
overall strength of the alliance.  
The main negotiations regarding reversion were the debates to pursue a “denuclearized” 
reversion of Okinawa. When considering change in the US-Japan alliance, the “denuclearized” 
reversion of Okinawa represents the most significant change in US policy in the region. Within 
the Nixon government, top security and foreign policy advisors discussed maintaining nuclear 
deterrence across the globe frequently. In Japan, the non-nuclear policy remained the largest 
concern for reversion. Before reversion, the United States stored nuclear weapons in Okinawa 
and regularly transported nuclear weapons in the surrounding sea. Should reversion occur, the 
storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa would directly violate the non-nuclear policy of Japan.  
Prime Minister Sato eventually decided that the goal of reversion could only be met if the result 
was the denuclearized version.49 Eventually, the United States reverted control of Okinawa to 
Japan and the alliance shifted towards a more equal relationship. 
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Data and Analysis 
The Okinawa Issue: Fulfilled Roles and Important Consultations  
 Japan took control of Okinawa with full sovereignty in May 1972, following debates over 
security and sovereignty in the US-Japan Alliance. The Vietnam War increased tension for the 
United States and it was the US view that maintaining a strong relationship with Japan was vital. 
Maintaining the alliance ensured that the United States could stay engaged with the war. For 
military strength to continue, the United States viewed that the island of Okinawa was the vital 
basing location for the United States to maintain regional control. For the Japanese, this was the 
most significant political issue for US-Japan relations. It was the view of the Japanese 
government and citizens that the US presence in Okinawa represented continued American 
oppression and excess control of Japan’s sovereignty. This limit on Japanese sovereignty had 
been an issue since the United States first occupied Japan after World War II. The United States 
considered Okinawa to be an issue since Kennedy’s presidency. Each of the Prime Ministers of 
Japan had sought change to the Okinawa policy very early in the relationship. Most significant in 
these efforts were the three prime ministers leading up to reversion – Prime Minister Nobusuke 
Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, and Eisaku Sato.  
 During the 1960s, the United States believed that sending aid to Okinawa and negotiation 
with Japan would largely solve the Okinawa problem.50 In 1965, Prime Minister Sato focused 
heavily on the reversion of Okinawa and sought to reunite the island with Japan. For Japan, the 
major concerns were the US use of bases for nuclear-equipped weapons (B-52 bombers, and 
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nuclear submarines, etc.) and the quality of life for Okinawans.51 The United States was 
concerned about losing its position in the region because of increasing Japanese domestic 
opposition that could damage the stability of the security alliance. 1966 and 1967 signaled the 
beginning of major efforts by the Japanese government to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan in the next 5 years. President Nixon and his administration focused on reversion in 1969, 
when Nixon took office. 
 Nixon immediately emphasized a larger focus on international relations and the National 
Security Council began research on specific foreign policy issues. The Nixon administration 
quickly identified Okinawa as a difficult issue and “two key members of the inter-departmental 
study group on Okinawa became members of the new NSC staff.”52 With the Japanese Prime 
Minister pushing for reversion and Nixon’s staff focusing on US-Japan relations, there was an 
immediate move for determining how to best deal with the Okinawa issue.53  
The negotiations between the United States and Japan emphasize two important factors 
regarding the relationship. The negotiations of the 1960s witnessed significant improvements and 
growth in communication between the nations, partially due to shared economic benefits in 
combination with growing international interest in Japan. Furthermore, the United States and 
Japan shared desired outcomes such as increased security in Asia and growth in global trade. 
These negotiations signal both some shared understanding of ally roles and a strengthening in 
norms of consultation.  
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Fulfilling Roles in the Alliance 
 A denuclearized reversion was seemingly difficult in the 1960s, particularly because of 
the US desire to maintain a strong security stance in Asia. This policy challenge was recognized 
by many of the members of the Foreign Ministry in Japan and Sato’s advisors often suggested 
that the United States would not easily allow denuclearization. Shimoda Takezō, the ambassador 
to Washington at the time, suggested that achieving homeland-level reversion, let alone 
denuclearized reversion “would require considerable negotiation and mutual compromise by 
both governments.”54  
Before Nixon met with Prime Minister Sato in late November of 1969, a State 
Department Telegram considered the probable conversation topics between the two leaders. It 
emphasized reversion and the “stalemate on nuclear storage.”55 The telegram goes on to state 
that the most the United States could hope for was a re-entry policy that would allow the United 
States to bring nukes back into Japan if an emergency existed.56 However, this stipulation drew 
concern in the United States government and, more specifically, the United States military.  
 The United States viewed that it should maintain its nuclear security posture in East Asia 
and other regions.  I consider this goal of maintenance as a part of the US role conception in the 
alliance. In 1969, a National Security Council Paper stated that it was generally agreed upon 
“that the primary military purposes of our strategic forces are:  
• —to reduce the likelihood that nuclear war will occur. 
• —to protect ourselves and our Allies from the destructive consequence of nuclear wars, 
insofar as we can, and 
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• —to be capable of controlling strategic nuclear conflicts so that the possible outcomes 
leave the United States and its Allies in a relatively advantageous position.”57 
This set of goals suggests that the United States role was considered as a regional protector and 
challenger of communism. The United States viewed itself as what I would call a “peace 
enabler” or “peaceful guardian.” On November 4, 1972, Nixon spoke about peace in a 
nationwide radio address. He spoke about a “structure of peace” that he was attempting to create 
through “prolonged democracy” and “strength.”58 He argued that part of this peace structure was 
the development of “patterns of international behavior that will be accepted by other powers.”59 
Nixon’s statements reflect his desire to fulfill the US role as a peace enabler or guardian. The US 
nuclear shield policy was an extension of the structure of peace intended to deter enemies and 
protect allies in the event of nuclear weapon use. To add to this, the philosophy of the Nixon 
Doctrine was to remain committed and contribute to a peaceful world.60 Much of Nixon’s focus 
was on Asia and he was willing to protect allies if nuclear attack occurred but hoped to avoid 
military involvement.61 The nuclear shield was vital to the strategy for preventing threats from 
other nations.62 The nuclear umbrella, or “extended deterrence” policy was an arm of the US 
peace structure and maintaining was vital to fulfilling the US role.  
Japan was averse to nuclear weapons since the occupation and domestic pressure in Japan 
contributed to Sato’s decision to push for a denuclearized reversion. Japan’s role conception was 
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the faithful ally seeking to achieve peace. In a January 3, 1972 meeting between Ambassador 
Johnson and Ambassador Ushiba, the Japanese diplomat told Johnson that, “the concept of 
deterrence is still very unclear to Japanese politicians.”63 This quote illustrates the opposition of 
roles between the United States and Japan. Moreover, the quote suggests how consultation could 
benefit the alliance because more developed consultation may have helped the Japanese 
understand the need for deterrence capability. The Japanese government believed that as tensions 
decreased, deterrent power should decrease as well.  A misunderstanding of deterrence policy 
could contribute to a difference in role performance. This disagreement about policy behavior 
could also contribute to problems with completing denuclearized reversion.  
 Allowing US nuclear presence near Okinawa following reversion ensured that both allies 
fulfilled their role conceptions. The United States continued to fulfill its role as the peaceful 
guardian and Japan fulfilled its role as the peaceful partner opposed to a nuclear Okinawa and 
gained control over the island. The reversion was a crucial change in the relationship and helped 
stabilize the relationship. Because both nations fulfilled certain role conceptions, namely the 
guardian and support roles, expected behavior became clearer and the alliance maintained its 
stability. This policy shift supports the first hypothesis. Nations that are able to fulfill their roles 
are better allies because they follow expected allied behavior and know what to expect from 
allies.  
 How Consultations Helped Reversion 
In a US Embassy status report to the State Department in 1970, a joint communiqué 
between Nixon and Sato outlines the interests of the two countries. After reaffirming the Treaty 
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of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the two “agreed to enter immediately into consultations 
regarding specific arrangements, with the necessary legislative support, for accomplishing the 
early (during 1972) reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, 
including Japan.”64 Many of the documents from this time-period indicate that continued 
consultations should occur, at least informally. The United States repeatedly spoke on the 
importance of maintaining a security structure in the region – with the goal of deterring 
communist expansion. The joint Nixon-Sato statement heavily emphasized norms of consultation 
for creating effective reversion policies. The joint communiqué from Nixon and Sato reads, “The 
President and the Prime Minister agreed that their Governments should consult closely to assure 
a smooth transfer of administrative rights, including the solution of a number of financial and 
economic problems.”65 The document points to the US-Japan Consultative Committee as the 
group tasked with pushing through the necessary work that would enable the reversion to go 
smoothly. For Nixon and his foreign policy team, a smooth reversion was considered necessary 
early on to ensure that the United States got to maintain involvement in the region. Nixon and 
Sato viewed these consultations as integral to creating mutually beneficial reversion policies. 
 The status report includes details of preparatory work the United States was doing to 
ensure a smooth reversion of Okinawa and explains the United States role perception for Japan. 
According to the report, the most important goals for the United States were to maintain US 
business presence on Okinawa, to transfer civil administrative duties to the Japanese 
government, to shift defense responsibilities to Japan, and to build up economic strength of the 
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island for its residents. Japan granted control of Okinawa to the United States under the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, a treaty signed in 1960. 
Notably, the agreement states that, “Japan will grant the United States of America … the use of 
facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security … and its related arrangements.”66 So, while reversion policy 
was largely agreed upon, the issue surrounding nuclear weapons policy persisted because the 
United States was previously granted free reign to use military facilities on Okinawa. 
  Prime Minister Sato viewed consultation as a key aspect of the security relationship 
between the United States and Japan. In remarks to the Diet on January 31, 1968, he discussed 
the requirements for the possibility of a nuclear armed submarine arriving in Japan.67 He stated 
that prior consultation was necessary for any US weapons entering the country.68 The United 
States had to consult Japan about bases on Japan, but Okinawa continued to have nuclear 
weapons stored there until 1972. This required consultation regarding weapons is implied by 
Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and consultation certainly occurred 
leading up to the decision on reversion.69  
Based on the Japanese decision to allow the United States to use bases and transport 
nuclear weapons into Japan, they understood the US defensive role while still paying attention to 
domestic public opinion. These domestic struggles, in part, cemented the Japanese role 
perception of an anti-nuclear Japan that contrasted the US conception of Japan. Although Sato 
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was opposed to nuclear weapons from early on, it remains unclear what ultimately pushed him to 
seek the denuclearized reversion.70 The decision seems partially influenced by the role 
conception that Sato had for Japan as a security ally of the United States. The secret decision to 
allow nuclear weapons to enter the country also signals his belief in the importance of the US 
defensive role. It is important to recognize that this was a secret decision because it suggests that 
leaders, ambassadors, diplomats, and policymakers consulted regularly behind the scenes.  
It is also significant to note that many of the conversations regarding nuclear weapons 
occurred during backchannel negotiations. These consultations occurred for many years before 
reversion and particularly during the Nixon-Sato period. A norm of consultation does exist 
between the United States and Japan. The norm is explicitly stated in the US-Japan Security 
Treaty but also underlies the overall behavior of the United States and Japan as allies. The 
reversion negotiations are examples of this norm working both explicitly and informally. The 
norm of consultation is one of many possible norms that helps settle disputes. In the case of the 
Okinawa reversion negotiations, the second hypothesis is supported, if only marginally. The 
frequent deliberations about Okinawa during the Nixon presidency suggest that consultation 
helped create the reversion policy. Reversion was a major policy concern for a time and norms of 
consultation were able to address this type of policy-making process. Norms were established for 
transfer of government power during the occupation and may have contributed to the smooth 
reversion of Okinawa.  
Ultimately, the United States made the decision to give control of Okinawa back to Japan 
by the year of 1972. The agreement stipulated that the United States was required to remove 
nuclear weapons from Okinawa on the condition that they could place them back on the island in 
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the case of an emergency. The United States was also allowed to bring these nuclear weapons 
into any base in Japan rather than Okinawa alone. The United States continued to store nuclear 
weapons and transport them in and out of Japan even following reversion.71 In a briefing paper 
on reversion in 1972, the United States maintained this position and refused to allow inspection 
of possible storage sites in Japan. This silence is a part of a policy of non-confirmation 
previously established to maintain secrecy about the location of nuclear weapons. It is therefore 
likely that nuclear weapons remained either on or very nearby Japan.72  In 1972, however, this 
policy decision-making process facilitated consultation and allowed both the United States and 
Japan to fulfill their individual role conceptions.  
 
The Persian Gulf War and the Alliance: Role Mismatch and Weak Consultation 
 In the first post-Cold War conflict, the Persian Gulf War, Japan struggled to understand 
its role as a part of the international community. Japan’s decision-making following the Persian 
Gulf War created tension with the United States at the time.73 The slow response of Japan and 
the lack of clarity about US requests for assistance ultimately increased tensions between the 
United States and Japan. This conflict occurred at the same time that the United States and Japan 
were having economic disagreements due to large growth in the Japanese economy in the 1980s. 
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Both nations had an interest in the oil of the Gulf region but did not have similar security policies 
toward the region. Japan did not engage militarily during this conflict while the United States 
committed approximately 500,000 personnel. In this section, I analyze Congressional Reports, 
US Congress member statements, and leadership statements to provide an understanding of the 
US-Japan alliance during the Gulf War Crisis and the tensions that arose due to lack of 
communication and misunderstanding of roles.  
The Gulf Crisis started when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
Saddam Hussein argued that Kuwait was stealing oil and Kuwait’s high production of oil placed 
Iraq at an economic disadvantage.74 Iraq sought compensation for the allegedly stolen oil. 
Saddam Hussein had a strategic interest in Kuwait, owed the nation a significant amount of 
money from the Iran-Iraq war, and sought access to the Persian Gulf and increased oil reserves.75 
The response from the international community was quick and it unanimously condemned the 
attack the day after it occurred. The United States aimed to have the Iraqi forces removed from 
Kuwait by January 1991. When this did not occur, the United States and a coalition force 
launched a series of attacks on Iraq and the Iraqi forces.76 Ultimately, the coalition forces pushed 
Iraq out of Kuwait and the war ended. Although the United Nations and the allied nations were 
unified in their actions toward Iraq, tensions arose between the United States and Japan at this 
time due to disagreements about the proper responses for the two allies.  
Japan’s relationship with the Middle East was largely uneventful prior to 1990. Japan 
purchased oil from the region through the 1970s and 1980s but was largely disconnected from 
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politics in the region.77 Japan’s relationship with the Middle East was primarily an economic one 
that benefited by purchasing oil during the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s role conception in the 
international system remained closely tied to US security interests and did not seem tied to the 
Middle East. 
The US decision to invade Iraq challenged Japan’s role conception within the alliance 
and within the international system at large. With the Cold War at an end, Japan had solidified its 
role as the pacifist partner to the United States. The actions of Japan during the Persian Gulf War 
signaled and instance when the United States questioned Japan’s role in the alliance.78  The 
Japanese role in this conflict was constructed by exogenous pressures and a lack of developed 
international role. How was Japan to act as an ally without a role conception in the post-Cold war 
era? 
On August 5, 1990, Japan imposed economic sanctions on Iraq prior to following the 
United Nations resolutions.79 Japan quickly condemned the invasion and “froze Kuwaiti assets in 
Japan, embargoed Iraqi exports, halted Japanese private loans and investment to Iraq, and 
suspended official aid and trade credits.”80  Japan imported about sixty percent of its oil from the 
Gulf Region in 1990 but stopped importing oil during the Gulf War due to large reserves.81 In the 
following weeks and after forceful convincing from members of the United States government, 
Japan halted trade with Iraq and gave 100 million dollars to a coalition force.82  Eventually, 
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Japan gave approximately one billion dollars to support the coalition forces in the Middle East. A 
few weeks later, this sum increased to four billion dollars.  Japanese contributions totaled 
thirteen billion by the end of the conflict.83 The economic response of Japan’s government 
supported US interests in the region.  
However, the United States believed that Japan’s financial contributions were not 
enough. According to a 1990 Yomiuri newspaper article in Japan, “U.S. Officials stated that 
these efforts were not enough and cautioned that Japan would face criticism ‘unless Japanese 
flags fly in the Gulf.’”84 The Japanese government was caught between the United States 
pressure to contribute more than financial support and the Japanese public and government call 
to avoid military contributions.  
Roles Lost in Translation 
Japan faced two major challenges that slowed decision-making processes regarding the 
conflict. First, negative public opinion of the government response along with budgetary 
constraints prevented reactionary policy pursuits. Second, the United States continuously sent 
mixed signals about its interests abroad. Together, these two difficulties intensified the strain in 
the relationship. It was the view of the United States government that Japan failed to meet the 
expectations of an economically powerful nation in the post-Cold war international community.  
To illustrate these difficulties further, I use a Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report and a number of cables between the US Embassy in Tokyo and the Secretary of State, 
officials and researchers scrutinized Japan’s actions alongside US actions. The authors of the 
CRS report discussed the effects of the Gulf Crisis on the US-Japan alliance and argued that the 
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invasion “represented a major test for the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.”85 The report suggests 
that the tension between the United States and Japan arose from economic competition and a 
lowered security threat from the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War.86 In meetings between 
United States and Japanese officials, “President Bush and other U.S. leaders made clear …  that 
the United States expected Japan to do more than offer political support” and some officials 
“expected Japan to have a ‘physical presence’ in the Gulf” rather than merely maintaining a 
financial commitment.87 While there was acknowledgment of Japan’s constitutional limits, 
“officials at the White House, U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost and others were in favor of 
such a [military] presence and suggested it to Japanese leaders.”88 Kaifu’s attempts to engage 
militarily failed due to lack of support from the Diet. At one point, the Kaifu administration did 
try to introduce a bill that would allow about one thousand Self-Defense Force members to go to 
the region in a support role, but Diet opposition quickly challenged this proposition and LDP 
support was essentially nonexistent.89 It was not until after the conflict had ended that Japan 
recognized how to play a role in the post-Cold War community.  
The United States goal in the Gulf Crisis was twofold. The United States desired to 
sustain the sovereignty of Kuwait and defend the supply of oil in the region. President Bush 
outlined these goals in a speech to Congress in 1990. He emphasized the need for the United 
States to “defend common vital interests … support the rule of law … and stand up to 
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aggression.”90 He also spoke about the economic risks Iraq’s invasion posed: “an Iraq permitted 
to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power … to intimidate and coerce its 
neighbors.”91 Bush’s assertion is that Iraq may use its new power to gain more control of oil 
reserves. However, in the months leading up to the war, Bush and his administration struggled to 
explain the US goals to different audiences, including allies abroad.92 This challenge in the 
alliance suggests a lack of clear US goals, which resulted in a negative effect on public opinion 
in the United States and created confusion in Japan about US interests.93 Specifically, the 
unspecified interests and statements provided by the Bush administration fail to inform Japan 
about what behavior should be expected. This necessarily creates difficulty within the alliance 
and consultation would have made US interests clearer to allies. 
In the United States, members of Congress and other US officials bemoaned the fact that 
the United States was taking on much of the burden of the effort and its allies were not doing 
enough. For example, representative Duncan Hunter introduced a bill that would push the 
President to negotiate with Japan to increase Japan’s economic contribution to the Gulf Crisis.94 
The goal was to make Japan pay the United States the amount equal to Japanese oil imports from 
the Middle East in 1990. If they failed to pay, the U.S. would impose import duties on Japan.95 
Representative Pete Stark shared his frustration in the House of Representatives when he said, 
“Why not quit complaining about our budget deficits and help pay more of the cost of the 
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Persian Gulf operation” in reference to an article discussing Japan’s frustration with the United 
States failing to lower its budget deficit.96 As the United States paid more for air strikes and 
military engagement in the region, some found the Japanese lack of involvement frustrating. For 
“many U.S. officials, the Japanese government largely failed the test by responding to the crisis 
in ways that gave priority to Japanese political, legal and fiscal restraints at the expense of 
broader international responsibilities.”97 Japan failed to fulfill the role as the partner that the 
United States perceived it should be.  
From a foreign policy perspective, the decision-making process for the Japanese 
government was difficult. The potential for both international and domestic backlash were 
present, albeit for different reasons.  Prime Minister Kaifu was responding to criticism from the 
Japanese public regarding the U.S. invasion and the Liberal Democrat Party government was 
concerned about committing to a military response.98 There seem to be two main reasons for this 
hesitation. First and most obviously, the constitutional restriction on military use constrained 
Japan significantly. The ambiguity of constitutionally legitimate actions exacerbated this 
problem. Use of force was restricted by the constitution except for cases of self-defense.99 
Second, it seems that Kaifu did not recognize the magnitude of the invasion, resulting in his slow 
response and inability to make a decision regarding the Self Defense Force.100 He did introduce a 
bill at the time that would have allowed the SDF to be sent to Iraq, but by October the Japanese 
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Diet voted it down.101 Even with relatively fast-acting initial decision to commit to the United 
Nations sanctions, other decision-making was slow and vague and the Japanese government 
“stumble[d] almost continuously” while trying to formulate policy toward the Persian Gulf 
war.102  
The Japanese public and some members of the government did not support engagement 
with the conflict. While the oil supplies were important to Japan, Kaifu and others asserted that 
the conflict had little effect on Japan.103 The United States had a number of reasons for engaging 
in the war, but Japan considered the conflict to be a “fire on the other side of the river.”104 
Providing financial support seemed to be the policy that allowed Japan to fulfill a role as a 
pacifist partner to the United States. The government and public both had concerns about 
engaging militarily. As evidence of this, Japan designated the first four billion dollars of support 
for non-lethal activities.105 Moreover, Japan believed that the US response would elicit increased 
conflict.106 Japan was focused on issues closer to home and working towards energy 
independence prior to the crisis and did not aim to change its policy. Japan hoped to maintain its 
role as the pacifist partner with the United States fulfilling its security needs.   
The US role conception as stated by President Bush aimed to deter the aggression of 
states like Iraq and help other nations in self-defense.107 The president and his administration 
suggested that the United States was prepared to lead the international community in ending this 
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crisis. President Bush, in a joint session of Congress said, “there is no substitute for American 
leadership.”108 Secretary of State James Baker said, in 1990, “we remain the one nation that has 
the necessary political, military, and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a 
successful response by the international community.”109 As the U.S. fulfilled its role conception 
as the international coalition leader, it pressured other nations to follow in its footsteps to halt 
Iraq’s aggression. The Bush administration used public statements to emphasize its expectations 
of the international community and “U.S. officials used their allies’ dependence to pressure 
them.”110 US political leaders met with other world leaders “to underscore that the burden of this 
collective effort must be shared” and to fail to do so foundered the relationship.111 Japan’s slow 
reactions and internal debates suggested a lack of conviction to the United States. For some, “the 
Japanese response reinforced [doubts about cooperating] with Japan because of what they [U.S. 
officials] view as fundamentally divergent and competing economic and other interests of the 
two countries.”112  The tension that arose during this conflict was partially based upon a lack of 
shared understanding of roles.  
The evidence in this section illustrates that mismatched interests and misunderstood roles 
of the United States and Japan plagued the relationship. The mismatch of expectations supports 
the first hypothesis because tensions rose between the two nations and the allies did not 
formulate a mutual policy regarding the conflict. Japan did not have developed role conceptions 
for engagement in international crises and the United States held high expectations for allies. 
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How Role Confusion Impacts Consultation 
In 1990, Japan misunderstood the US role and the lack of consultation intensified the 
problems of role mismatch. Japan’s role conception as a peaceful supporter of US foreign policy 
did not fit with the US role perception of Japan as a burden-sharing ally that should do more than 
provide political and financial support. Moreover, Japan’s role in the international post-Cold War 
community was not developed in such a way that allowed Japan to have strong decision-making 
abilities in this case. Japan played the role of the pacifist partner since World War II and the Gulf 
Crisis was the first instance where they were expected to break that role developed over 40 years. 
Breaking away from a role constructed over decades does not happen easily. Japan failed to see 
the importance of this conflict in the same light that the United States saw the conflict because of 
the mismatch of role conception and perception alongside a lack of consultation. The oil-
dependent United States overestimated the Japanese dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Japan 
sought energy independence. The lack of regular consultation intensified these problems because 
the allies did not share direct interests, and the allies had not considered what their interaction 
would be in international conflict. 
Japan’s role conception remained as a peaceful partner of the United States and this role 
mismatch constrained Japan’s ability to consult with the United States. Because individuals, 
groups, and larger communities socially construct norms over long periods of time, consulting 
about sudden issues through the usual channels fails. US-Japan relations focused largely on 
economics in the 1980s, and the US-Japan alliance maintained its protector-partner security 
relationship. Japan’s economic growth throughout the 1970s and 1980s did create two challenges 
for their role. First, the United States role expectation for Japan shifted and US officials believed 
that Japan should fulfill leadership roles. Second, the economic growth combined with the 
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effects of sudden conflict pressured Japan “to take on new global political responsibilities” yet 
did not prepare Japan for engaging directly in conflict.113 
The formal norms of consultation in US-Japan treaties and agreements were established 
to ensure continued discussion of the defense of Japan in case of conflict. The US-Japan 
relationship emphasized economic ties so consultation would have occurred more frequently 
regarding issues of trade or currency rather than armed conflict. Because the Gulf Crisis emerged 
so quickly, Japan was not prepared to consult about the process for offensive military 
engagement, particularly outside of Asia. Moreover, Japan’s embrace of pacifism constrains 
Japan’s ability to engage anyway. The slow response of the Japanese government shows the lack 
of preparedness for this type of situation and the desire to remain pacifistic.114  
The Gulf War therefore served as a push for Japan to become an international community 
member. First and foremost, the role that Japan should play in the international system was 
unclear at the beginning of the crisis. The Japan of the post-Cold War was “apprehensive about 
what it sees as the imposition on it of unwanted roles by the United States.”115 The United States 
shift in expectations was sudden and consultation on new Japanese role expectations did not 
occur. Japan’s desired role would have maintained a commercial focus that benefits from a 
pacifistic security policy.116 Following the conflict however, it seemed that there was an 
increased desire in Japan to play a larger role in the international community. In a memorandum 
to Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia John Kelly it was noted that 
“Japan is seeking a way to move beyond ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to a more active leadership role 
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in the emerging new world order.” This, along with similar assessments, suggested that the Gulf 
Crisis was a wake-up call to Japan; one that was “a positive step toward mitigating this tension” 
that arose due to the crisis.117   
Ultimately, this conflict forced Japan to have a deeper interest in playing a role in the 
international community and moving beyond ‘checkbook diplomacy.’118 First, because Japan had 
received backlash from the United States, there was an increased desire to engage more in the 
future. Second, this conflict lowered public respect for Japan in the United States and increased 
anti-American sentiments in Japan.119 Ambassador Armacost suggested that Japan learned from 
the crisis that it could not merely follow the United States lead in foreign policy.120 By doing 
“too little too late … Japan has been intermittently exposed to such criticism from abroad” which 
has had both negative and positive effects.121 It has both created isolationist desire but also an 
increased desire to play a more proactive role in the international system rather than a reactive 
one. However, the institutionalized anti-military sentiment still exists strong in Japan, even after 
the tensions from the Gulf Crisis.   
Although the impacts of the conflict did not improve the alliance relationship, the 
findings support the hypotheses. The first hypothesis is supported by the lack of role 
understanding in the conflict. The United States fulfilled its role but had expectations that Japan 
failed to meet, resulting in tensions increasing. The second hypothesis is supported, albeit, less 
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than the first. Consultation is difficult to assess in this case for three reasons. First, the Gulf 
Conflict occurred suddenly, making any significant amount of consultation unlikely to occur. 
Second, the lack of a developed role for Japan in military conflict weakened Japan’s ability to 
consult about engagement. Finally, social pressures from inside of Japan constrained the 
government’s ability to make decisions about the conflict early on. Japan had to act quickly but 
did not have the experience to do so.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on my findings, role theory provides a framework for understanding how roles 
contribute to the determination of US foreign policy decision-making toward allies. Second, a 
norm of consultation can improve the ability to determine policies if implemented early in the 
alliance. These two variables can positively influence change in alliance relations between two 
countries.  
This research suggests that these variables are also not mutually exclusive or even 
alternative explanations for decision-making in foreign policy. It seems that these explanations 
complement other explanations and expand the understanding about decision-making. Increased 
understanding and compliance with roles improves the ability of two allies to make well-
developed policy decisions. Consultation may foster increased mutual understanding of roles and 
of possible domestic pressures from each nation. Furthermore, domestic politics and domestic 
interests seem to play a large role in determining how foreign policy decision-making is done. Of 
course, issues of national security also influence decision making on foreign policy, particularly 
in the context of defense and security policy.  
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 The data that I collected and analyzed support the proposed hypotheses; changes in 
alliance relations and policy decision-making are partially influenced by understanding of 
national role conceptions and norms of regular consultation. The decision to revert a 
“denuclearized” Okinawa to Japan signals a mutually beneficial political decision. Okinawa’s 
reversion was beneficial to Japan because it eased domestic pressures and granted sovereignty. 
For the United States the policy was beneficial because the United States maintained its 
defensive capabilities in the region. The normative basis for consultation found in agreements 
and many secret conversations between US and Japanese leaders suggests that consultation is 
positively influential for decision-making. The Persian Gulf Crisis, on the other hand, suggests a 
more complex relationship challenge for the United States and Japan. The lack of shared role 
conceptions and expectations post-Cold War increased tension between the allies. In the 1990s, 
consultation was less effective because Japan’s role conceptions did not meet the United States 
expectations and a norm had not developed to formulate conflict policies outside of the 
protector-partner relationship.  
 Foreign policy creation, particularly focused on alliances, can benefit by integrating 
methods for identifying roles and improving the norm of consultation. If the United States and 
Japan were to focus more on where the roles come from, namely, how domestic pressures impact 
role development, policymakers could predict allies’ interests sooner. Greater attention to ally’s 
roles would also increase trust between nations because roles give some predictive power and 
strengthen understanding of national interests. Consultation is a necessary part of any 
relationship, though particularly pertinent for international relations. Integrating formal 
structures for the norm of consultation seems more powerful than assuming it will occur. While 
leaders will consult over policy, it would be beneficial to establish an agreement that explicitly 
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states the intention to consult over specific policies repeatedly. In these ways, foreign policy 
could be beneficially impacted by deeper understanding of roles and norms of consultation.  
 In future research, studies that use consultation should consider framing specific 
agreements and assessing how the effectiveness of the formalized norm changes over time.  
Analyzing these same variables in the context of other alliances may also be beneficial to 
verifying the usefulness of this form of analysis. The norm of consultation is only one possible 
norm that can be impacted by role variation and it would be valuable to consider alternative 
norms and their relationship to the role of the nation. If I were to continue this work, I would 
analyze the formation of the United States and Japanese role conceptions and address how 
domestic challenges effect role conception in greater depth. It is important for future research to 
provide a complete picture of role development to ensure the validity of leadership behavioral 
analysis. Roles and consultation provide a lot of opportunities for analyzing change and decision-
making. Research on decision-making should aim to combine theory and practice for 
understanding foreign policy change in alliances.    
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